Presidents often prepare for major summits by asking experts to provide assessments of a foreign leader’s intentions, along with the threats that leader may pose. These expert assessments establish an important baseline that policymakers can then use to recommend US government positions, including potential red lines and concessions that may be needed during negotiations. Absent presidential agreement on this baseline, it’s almost impossible to develop realistic goals and, in the case of North Korea, actually address ongoing threats to US national security.
The truth hurts
In fairness, Trump did not get Kim to specifically agree to a freeze when they met in Singapore, and Kim has continued his nuclearization apace. Still, this reality poses a continued risk.
This raises real questions about whether Kim actually plans to denuclearize. Even if he does, any denuclearization process will be more difficult because North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continue to grow.
With an increased nuclear threat from North Korea, US negotiators — if they are allowed to do any presidential prep — should emphasize that the concessions we require from Kim before we give him what he wants just got larger, in line with the size of his nuclear program.
Kim’s love isn’t blind
Kim’s willingness to attend a summit again means that he thinks he’s getting something for it. We know that he has focused on sanctions relief in the past, as well as an armistice agreement to end the Korean War and begin US troop withdrawals from the Korean Peninsula.
While he may claim he’s made good faith gestures — including returning US hostages — we need to make clear that absent any steps that actually have to deal with denuclearization itself, we’re not giving him what he wants the most, especially sanctions relief or troop withdrawal. Sanctions are in place because of illegal North Korean activity, including illegal nuclear proliferation. Once that activity stops, we can talk sanctions relief.
US troops on the Korean Peninsula and in Japan are similarly where they are because of active threats, including from North Korea. As threats dissipate, military commanders will review our force posture. Absent any change in the threat outlook, that review would be premature.
The writing’s on the wall
We don’t have to wait until a second summit to gauge Kim’s intentions. Following the Singapore Summit, we have not seen US disarmament experts substantively engage with their North Korean counterparts. And if they don’t meet before this second summit, it will be almost a foregone conclusion that we won’t have specific progress to announce on denuclearization. Our experts are a critical ingredient to coming up with specific steps toward denuclearization and getting the North Koreans to agree to them.
Ahead of finalizing the details for a second summit, we should require bilateral US-North Korea expert level disarmament talks to hammer out specific agreements we can announce. Another vaguely worded statement will just kick the nuclear can down the road even further, giving Kim even more time to build more nukes.
Source : Nbcnewyork